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| I would like to thank the CALL person(s) that recently sent me the 4 care packages of Harlequin romance novels, Glamour, People, Southern Living, Elle, and Marie Claire magazines. Not only was it rather humorous, it was a big morale booster at the JSOTF-P HQs (really!). Stuffed in one of the boxes was the 7 August issue of the Lamp. Front page news was LTG Caldwell's task to the new CGSC students to blog, write an article, speak in public, and do a media interview about the military during their academic year at Ft Leavenworth (MAJ Will Bowman, you've already knocked out 2-4, way to go!). I was excited to read about this for many reasons. First, as the Commandant stated, it tells the story about the military and its people. Second, it is strategic communications on a grand scale, not just tasked to the Public Affairs Officer as units' so often do. Third, it builds a culture in our officer corps that takes an active approach to Information Engagement. Forth, it promulgates a philosophy about the relationship between the military, the media and information, that because it is proactive and emphasizes transparency, builds trust between the media, the military and the populace; this is so incredibly important, especially in COIN.
In OEF-P, the JSOTF-P takes its Public Affairs guidance from the Public Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The Department of State and the Department of Defense do not always take the same active posture when it comes to information that we present to the media. Adding to this predicament, there is a segment of the Philippine media that is very negative towards the U.S. presence in the Southern Philippines. When this segment of the media does not get its information from the U.S. Public Affairs officers (DoD and DoS) it finds its information where ever it can, and often times it is very inaccurate. For hard working military professionals that feel they helping the populace by their deeds, this can at times be frustrating.
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| Understanding the human element in the host nation, the region and even in the U.S. is critical to success. JSOTF planners must take into account that there are usually segments of the population feeling disenfranchised. Counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines should be viewed as a potential long-term campaign that can only succeed through a continuous effort to maintain public support.
Military personnel share responsibility for influencing public opinion within the area of operations. Actions at the tactical level can have much wider implication. A thousand good works at the local level will go unheralded, and seemingly valorous acts of heroism by U.S. personnel (given the news cycle and the "CNN effect or the Zamboanga Times effect") can negatively affect public opinion in the host nation and detonate worldwide.
What is the human terrain in OEF-P.? Let's start with the obvious; U.S. forces, host nations forces, the insurgent groups, the populace, and populations that exert influence on the area). JSOTF-P planners must know the elements of human geography including culture, language, and societal organization and must know how to influence them through productive relationships with leaders.
But the environment is a little more dynamic than that. Twice in the last week we've had SOF general officers outside of the theater asked about troop movements within the JOA. Now the human terrain extends to Tampa, FL. There are the influential Christian intelligentsia circles in Manila that view a strong Mindanao and a strong Muslim population as a threat to those that currently hold power. These circles have influence at the diplomatic level of US engagement. There are members of the US Country team that exert pressure on the JSOTF. There are other sources of human terrain that influence operations such as the media and the local government officials that influence their writing. One of the more frustrating groups of human terrain that negatively affect operations is the group of senior military leaders in the U.S. that do not understand the mission, the constraints and the limitations of the JSOTF. "Why don't you just go get the bad guys if you know where they are?" When I hear that question from visitors to the JOA it tells me that they haven't read the EXORD, the campaign plan, the ROE, let alone understand what role the U.S. is playing in this counterinsurgency fight. This is not Iraq or Afghanistan, and the rules are completely different. We are forbidden from unilateral operations. JSOTF-P works "through, by and with" the Armed Forces of the Philippines in a direct FID not involving combat role. And as Iraq and Afghanistan wind down we might find ourselves doing more operations like OEF-P. 
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| The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are engaged in a battle with the Lawless MILF Groups (LMG, as they are called by the AFP), and it is very serious. Over the last month in Lanao and Cotabato provinces of Mindanao, the AFP and the LMG have engaged in vicious combat. The fighting is nasty and the people of Mindanao are the ones that are suffering.
I provided a briefing today to AFP senior leadership in Mindanao and learned that there are 5,207 dislocated families in one town; civilian casualties are in the hundreds. Houses are burned by the insurgents in order to cover their withdrawal. Rice fields that feed a village for a year are destroyed by the insurgents in order to blame it on the AFP. I surveyed the battlefield and toll on the population is heavy. The AFP is battling the insurgents, and since the insurgents can’t battle the AFP they are taking it out on the civilians.
As the USMIL conducts its mission here, at times there is frustration. From our position the solutions seem so easy. Establish a CMOC. Clear-Hold-Build. Combined Arms Approach. These things make sense to us, but receive a nod and shrug from our counterparts, as if to say, “You just don’t get it, you don’t understand.” They are right. Problems must be solved by the AFP. They’re not called CMOCs here. It’s not uncommon to find yourself talking a fellow US officer “down off the ledge” with a pep talk about measuring success over time not in an instant, about “planting the seed” instead of “hammering it home;” which was the purpose of my visit, to plant the seed of Phase IV operations. It met a cold reception, however, as I was leaving the briefing room I noticed the Lieutenant General scribbling notes on my slides and stuffing them in his pocket. Little victories.
I reread the first two chapters of the "Commander's Handbook for SFA" because of what it says that it takes to be an advisor; maturity, professionalism, competence, patience, knowledge, flexibility, innovativeness, motivation, confidence……….situational awareness and cultural effectiveness!
Back at our base, one of the US officers was appalled that officers in the AFP were laughing at their casualties. “Did you hear those guys? They said that they lost four soldiers and then they all laughed. I can’t believe they think this is funny!” Laughing in the Philippine culture means many things. It can mean you are happy or that something is funny. It can also be a nervous release of energy when a Filipino is uncomfortable or uneasy, and at times it can be misinterpreted. To the AFP this is completely serious and just as in any culture, casualties are not humorous. The AFP does not think this is funny, but quite the opposite. 
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| Making decisions in a COIN environment requires leaders to think differently about problems. At times, quick decisions must be made because time is of the essence. During these situations leaders rely on intuition to make decisions. Intuition is based heavily on experience, yet COIN often presents unfamiliar circumstances where intuition will lead to the wrong decisions.
Those engaged in decision making under critical conditions should be capable of reliable intuition based on experience and established mental models, sound reasoning based on logical weighing of fresh information, and strong self awareness in order to understand how to balance intuition and reason. What makes effective cognition so difficult in countering insurgency is the diminishing utility of the mental models on which COIN relies. Fifty plus years ago, social scientists (i.e. Kant, Piaget,Kelly, Craik) observed that because the human mind is poor at comprehending reality’s complexity and dynamism, it relies on simple models to solve problems. Such models, called schema, are based heavily on experience and are the platform for intuition. The trouble is that reliance on mental models can limit, or worse, misguide cognition when humans are faced with unfamiliar and dynamic conditions, which aggravate complexity. This suggests that understanding COIN–complex, unfamiliar and dynamic as it is—can be a huge challenge. Yet without that understanding, other aspects of COIN, namely, shaping conditions and conducting direct operations, cannot succeed. Recent work by neuroscientists have identified certain cognitive abilities as being particularly important in security operations because they create time-information advantages; that is, they use time to gain information, information to gain time, and the combination of time and information to gain operational space and advantage. These abilities are (1) anticipation, (2) opportunism, (3) decision speed, and (4) learning in action. In operations, these abilities are particularly valuable in achieving temporary advantage when the opposing sides are both networked, as is the case in COIN in the Philippines.
Don’t Know What We Don’t Know: There is a tendency to think that the people in COIN forces and agencies are already battle-wise, and many are to some extent. However, despite facing an adversary known to be both networked and clever, cognitive performance in networked operations has not been a high U.S. priority compared to the way other COIN resources have been developed and used, especially when it comes to force on force tactics such as “clear, hold, build.” Even with the advent of net-centric operations, U.S. COIN efforts remain preoccupied with structures and enamored with the technologies of force. Personnel training and education for these types of unique problems id difficult and calls for specific COIN centered problems. Training and education centers are beginning to change as the armed forces are reinvigorating COIN training in response to uneven performance in multiple COIN environments around the world. That U.S. national security organizations have not even tried to define the particular cognitive abilities that are most important in countering insurgents, the chief current threat to national security, is a major omission.
Find, Fix, Finish: DoD has described one of the operational challenges of counterterrorism as being able to find, identify, track, and eliminate terrorists. Even this approach, while narrow, implies formidable cognitive demands: Where will the insurgents appear? Who is being recruited and motivated, and how? How can insurgents be distinguished from ordinary citizens, or even from radical ones who may or may not be predisposed to violence? How can COIN operations possibly monitor the movement of all potential insurgents? How might their behavior facilitate finding and tracking them? How can insurgents be eliminated when their identities and whereabouts are uncertain and when more are recruited all the time? Given the risks of fanning the fires of insurgency, the challenges of finding, identifying, and tracking terrorists cannot be met by territorial control or by technology without effective brainwork.
COIN is an environment that requires leaders to think on a complex level. Past experiences may not be effective in developing the intuition required for a complex COIN environment. Research shows that decision makers rely overwhelmingly on intuition, as opposed to reasoning, when conditions are dangerous or otherwise critical and time is short. This holds true for firefighters, hospital personnel, and those in other high-pressure professions, including soldiers and others involved in security operations. Yet conditions prevalent in 21st-century COIN raise questions about such heavy reliance on intuition in time-sensitive decision making. Leaders must understand that intuition may not be the best way to make decisions in a complex COIN environment because: (1) intuition is based heavily on experience, yet COIN often presents unfamiliar circumstances; (2) because COIN is so complex—more so than regular warfare because of the ambiguity of force—that intuition based on simplified mental models of reality may not suffice; (3) by making fresh information readily available, information networking can reduce dependence on experience-based intuition. 
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